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LAW APPLICABLE TO LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
DUE TO TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS INVOLVING
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
by
MAREK SWIERCZYNSKI*, ŁUKASZ ŻARNOWIEC**
The authors examine the problem of the law applicable to liability for damages due
to traffic  accidents  involving  autonomous  vehicles.  Existing  conflict-of-laws
regulation adopted in the Rome II Regulation and both Hague Conventions of 1971
and 1973 is criticized.  Upon examination of these legal  instruments,  it  becomes
clear that  existing regulation is very complex and complicated.  In effect authors
recommend revisions to the legal framework. Proposed solutions are balanced and
take into consideration both the interests of the injured persons, as well the persons
claimed  to be  liable.  New  approach  allows  for  more  individual  consideration
of specific cases and direct to better outcome of the disputes. The findings may be
useful  in handling  the  cases  related  to use  of algorithms  of artificial  intelligence
in private international law.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Implementation  of artificial  intelligence  algorithms  into  transport  has
a direct  impact  on the civil  liability  regime.  High mobility  of autonomous
vehicles,  different  places  of manufacturing,  purchase  and  injury  due
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to traffic  accidents  means  that  complex  transnational  torts  scenarios  are
more probable. It is expected that autonomous vehicles will increase road
safety.1 Currently,  approx.  90 % of traffic  accidents  are  caused  by human
errors.2 However,  road  accidents  are  unavoidable.  Moreover,  artificial
intelligence  algorithms  controlling  autonomous  vehicles  have  to “make
decisions”  about  the life  and  health  of traffic  participants  in critical
moments. The decision process can take place with or without the human
intervention.3 The degree  of vehicles  autonomy  may  vary.  There  are
vehicles  allowing  the driver  to take  control  of the car  or equipped  with
artificial intelligence systems that only assist the driver.4
In order to determine who is liable for damages, it is necessary to take
into  account  the technology  used,  including  the degree  of autonomy
of the implemented algorithm and its impact on the occurrence of the traffic
accident.5 The allocation  of liability  depends  on the circumstances
of the individual case.  It may involve the liability of the driver,  the owner
of the vehicle,  but also of the manufacturer,  parts manufacturer,  importer,
distributor, vehicle seller, software developer, transport provider or internet
service  provider.6 Uncertainty  exists  as regards  the allocation
of responsibilities between different economic operators. Each case must be
settled  under  applicable,  national  legal  system  (the applicable  law).
Depending  on the person  claimed  to be  liable  the governing  law  is  to be
determined on the basis of different conflict-of-laws rules. Court may need
1 Michałowska,  M.  and  Ogłoziński,  M.  (2017)  Smart  Solutions  in Today’s  Transport:  17th
International  Conference  on Transport  Systems  Telematics,  TST  2017,  Katowice –  Ustroń,
Poland, April 5–8, 2017, pp. 191–202.
2 Data based on the European Commission's report 'Saving lives: making cars safer in the EU'
(COM(2016) 0787 final).
3 Cassart,  A.  (2017)  Aéronefs  sans  pilote,  voitures  sans  conducteur:  la  destination  plus
importante  que  le  voyage.  In:  H.  Jacquemin,  A.  De Streel  (eds.).  L’intelligence  artificielle
et le droit. Bruxelles, p. 319. As for the scope of decision autonomy of artificial intelligence,
cf. Nevejans, N. (2017) Traité de droit et d’éthique de la robotique civile. Bordeaux, pp. 134–137.
4 Stone,  P.  et al.  (2016)  Artificial  Intelligence  and  Life  in 2030.  One  Hundred  Year  Study
on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015–2016 Study Panel, Stanford University, September
2016. [online] Available from: https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032
016fnl_singlep.pdf, p. 19 [Accessed 15 March 2020]. AI technologies may present new safety
risks for users when they are embedded in products and services. For example, as result
of a flaw  in the object  recognition  technology,  an autonomous  car  can  wrongly  identify
an object on the road and cause an accident involving injuries and material damage [White
paper  on Artificial  Intelligence –  A European  approach  to excellence  and trust,  Brussels,
19.2.2020 COM(2020) 65 final (hereinafter referred to as „White Paper AI”), p. 12].
5 Gurney, J. (2013) Sue my car not me: Products liability and accidents involving autonomous
vehicles. University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy, 2, pp. 247–277; Marchand,
G.  and  Lindor,  R.  (2012)  The coming  collision  between  autonomous  vehicles  and
the liability system. Santa Clara Law Review, 52, pp. 1321–1340.
6 Gurney, J. (2013) Op. cit., pp. 258–266.
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to apply not only the specific rules on traffic accidents but also conflict-of-
-laws  rules  on product  liability  or even  general  conflict-of-laws  rules
on torts/delicts.
There is an apparent connection between the general topic of this paper
(conflict-of-laws)  and  the specific  topic  (autonomous  vehicles).
The connection  is  apparent  in particular  with  regard  to party  autonomy,
choice  of law and how questions  of liability  can  be  solved in the context
of autonomous  vehicles.  These  issues  are  closely  related  to the different
types  of autonomous  vehicles.  As long  as algorithms  implemented
in the vehicles act as simple executors of human will, one should establish
a normative  attribution  to the human  being  in question.  For  the cases
in which the autonomous vehicles exceed this dependency, no clear answer
on the applicable  law  may  be  found  in the existing  conflict-of-laws
regulation.  The applicability  of the current  conflict-of-laws  regulations
needs  therefore  to be  explained,  taking  into  consideration  the legislator’s
intention behind the respective rules.
Currently,  determination  of the law  applicable  to traffic  accidents  is
highly problematic. In most European countries the governing law is to be
determined  on the basis  of the Convention  on the law  applicable  to traffic
accidents, which dates back to the 1970s. The law of the place of accident is
used as the basic connecting factor between the accident and the applicable
law.  However,  there  are  exceptions  to this  main  rule.  An alternative  is
the applicability  of the law  of the country  of registration  of the vehicle.
The question  arises  as to whether,  with  regard  to the accidents  involving
autonomous vehicles,  this  solution is  satisfactory.  The current  conflict-of-
-laws regulation  seems  to be  excessively  complex  in case  of  traffic
accidents.7 That  is  why,  clear  and  understandable  conflict-of-laws  rules
protecting the injured persons are needed.8
In this paper we are going to answer the following research questions.
Firstly,  whether  the existing  conflict-of-laws  regulation  is  adapted
to the liability arising from the damages due to traffic  accidents involving
autonomous  vehicle.  Secondly,  in case  such  rules  are  relevant,  whether
the result  they  produce  is  satisfactory  and,  in particular,  does  their
application takes into account the protection of the injured party. Thirdly,
7 Klyta,  W.  (2015)  In:  M.  Pazdan  (ed.).  System  Prawa  Prywatnego.  Prawo  prywatne
międzynarodowe. Warszawa, p. 883.
8 Brożek, B. (2017) The Troublesome ‘Person’. In: V. Kurki and T. Pietrzykowski (eds.). Legal
Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn. Cham, pp. 3–13.
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what  are  the possible  solutions  and  how  the existing  conflict-of-laws
regulation could be changed.
2. LACK OF FULL HARMONISATION OF THE CONFLICT-
-OF-LAWS RULES ON TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
The basic  legal  act  in the EU  on the applicable  law  to the non-contractual
liability, which is the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament
and of the Council (Rome II) does not provide complete set of conflict-of-laws
rules.  Among  other  exclusions  and  derogations,  the Rome  II  Regulation
provides in its  Article  28 that  international  conventions may prevail  and
different  set  of conflict-of-laws  rules  can  be  applied  by the court
of the member  state.9 This  is  the case  of both  the 1971  Hague  Convention
on the Law  Applicable  to Traffic  Accidents10 and  the 1973  Hague  Convention
on Dangerous Product Liability,  which contain special  conflict-of-laws rules
applicable  for  damages  due  by traffic  accidents  involving  autonomous
vehicles.  As we  see,  Article  28  of the Rome  II  Regulation  allows  for
the coexistence of different sets of conflict-of-laws rules. 
In result,  different  substantive  laws  may  apply  in cases  relating
to liability  for  damage  caused  by traffic  accidents  involving  autonomous
vehicles depending on the adjudicating court of a member state. That alone
problem  calls  the need of unification  and simplification  of the system for
determining  the law  applicable  to traffic  accidents.  Such  change  would
increase legal certainty and reduce the possibility of forum shopping,11 which
is  a strategy  of referring  a case  to a court  of a particular  country  in order
to apply  a law  more  favourable  to the claimant.12 Under  the current
divergent and non-uniformed rules the proceedings can be costly and time-
9 Nagy, C. (2010) The Rome II Regulation and Traffic Accidents: Uniform Conflict Rules with
some Room for forum shopping – how so?. Journal of Private International Law (Clunet), 6 (1),
p. 93.
10 Graziano, T. (2016)  Cross-border Traffic Accidents in the EU – the Potential Impact of Driverless
Cars, European Parliament – Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union. Brussels.
11 On the risk of forum shopping under the Rome II Regulation due to the existence in some EU
Member States of the 1971 and 1973 Hague Conventions, cf. Von Hein, J. (2009) Of Older
Siblings  and  Distant  Cousins:  The Contribution  of the Rome  II  Regulation
to the Communitarisation  of Private  International  Law.  Rabels  Zeitschrift  für  ausländisches
und internationales Privatrecht, 73, p. 474; Unberath, H. and Cziupka, J. (2011) In: T. Rauscher
(ed.).  Europäisches  Zivilprozess-  und  Kollisionsrecht  EuZPR/EuIPR  Kommentar. München,
p. 749.
12 On the definition of forum shopping  see: point 96 of the Opinion of advocate general  Leger
delivered on 8 December 2005 in the case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV, Roche Diagnostic
Systems Inc., NV Roche SA, Hoffmann-La Roche AG, Produits Roche SA, Roche Products
Ltd, F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG, Hoffmann-La Roche Wien GmbH, Roche AB v.  Frederick
Primus, Milton Goldenberg, ECLI:EU:C:2005:749.
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-consuming for  the injured party claiming damages.  The mains questions
involve the following issues:
1) how to identify the exact cause of the accident,
2) how to provide evidence of that cause and, consequently, and
3) how to decide against whom to pursue a claim for compensation?
Is  it  the owner  of the car  or its  insurer  or the manufacturer
of the car or its parts? Or, in case of the algorithms, the defendant
should be an internet service provider?
The need for unification and simplification of the conflict-of-laws rules
does not  require that the injured party must  be treated in favoured way.
Legal framework of conflict-of-laws rules should be balanced and take into
account also the legitimate interests of the person claimed to be liable. This
argument is particularly relevant where the likelihood of liability is directly
linked to the innovation. Making a producer solely liable for the damages
would discourage innovation.
Where the law of another EU member state is  designated, the network
created  by Council  Decision  2001/470/EC  of 28  May  2001  establishing
a European Judicial  Network  in civil  and commercial  matters,13 plays a part
in assisting courts of the member states with regard to the content of foreign
law.
3. THE CONFLICT-OF-LAWS REGULATION OF THE 1971 
HAGUE CONVENTION
Number  of European  countries  are  members  to the Hague  Convention
of 4 May  1971  on the law  applicable  to traffic  accidents.14 In accordance  with
the principle  of universality,  the Convention  applies  even  where
13 OJ L  174,  27.6.2001,  p. 25.  To guarantee  access  to appropriate,  good-quality  information,
the Commission regularly updates it in the Internet-based public information system set up
by Council  Decision  2001/470/EC.  See  Report  from  the Commission  to the Council,
the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee of 16 May 2006
on the application  of Council  Decision  2001/470/EC  establishing  a European  Judicial
Network  in civil  and  commercial  matters  [COM(2006)  203  final –  Not  published
in the Official Journal]. However, the available information is not always adequate and up
to date and the website only contains information about EU legal systems while the Rome II
Regulation may require judges to apply the law of a third State.
14 As of 28  December  2018,  the Convention  is  in force  in 21  States,  i.e. the United  States
of America  and  the United  States  of America:  Austria,  Belarus,  Belgium,  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina,  Croatia,  The Czech  Republic,  Macedonia,  France,  Latvia,  Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Morocco,  The Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain,  Switzerland,  Ukraine,  data  available  at the website:  https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=81=81 [Accessed 15 March 2020].
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the applicable  law  is  not  that  of the State  Party  to the Convention,
irrespective of whether the condition of conflict of laws reciprocity has been
satisfied  [Article  11(2)].  In the context  of autonomous  vehicles,  it  is
important to underline that the Convention does not apply to the liability
of manufacturers,  dealers  and  repairers  of vehicles  [Article  2(1)].  These
exclusion should be understood broadly and include manufacturers, sellers
and  repairers  of components.15 It  is,  however,  difficult  to justify  why
the Convention should not be applied to car manufacturers and at the same
time  be  applicable  to the manufacturers  of their  parts.  Still,  on the basis
of such  exclusion,  we  are  of opinion  that  it  includes  components  based
on algorithms  that  had  been  used  to control  the autonomous  functions
of the vehicle or used in the cars software.
Traffic  accident  within  the meaning  of the Hague  Convention  means
an accident involving one or more power-driven or non-powered vehicles
involving traffic on a public road, in an area open to the public or in private
property  accessible  to certain  persons  (Article  1,  Sentence  2).  The very
concept  of accident,  although  essential  for  determining  the scope
of the Convention  and  for  determining  the applicable  law  on the basis
of the Convention,  is  not  defined  by the provisions  of the Convention.  It
may  be  understood  as a sudden  external  event  involving  one  or more
vehicles and leading to personal injury or damage to property.
In principle,  the law  applicable  to non-contractual  civil  liability
in the event of a road traffic accident is, under the provisions of the Hague
Convention,  the law  of the State  in which  the accident  occurs  (Article  3).
However, Article 4 of the Convention provides many derogations from this
general rule. 
Although  the Convention  does  not  explicitly  address  the question
of the choice of the law by the parties, such solution (based on the freedom
of will  of the parties)  seems  to be  accepted  by many  authors,16 and
confirmed  in the courts.17 The law  chosen  by the parties  has  priority  and
15 Klyta, W. (2015) Op. cit., p. 891.
16 Hoyer,  H.  (1991)  Haager  Straβenverkehrsübereinkommen und Rechtswahl  der  Parteien,
Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, p. 341; Kegel, G. (2000) In: G. Kegel and K. Schurig (eds.).
Internationales  Privatrecht. München,  p. 645;  Halfmeier,  A.  and Sonder,  N.  (2011)
In: G. Calliess  (ed.).  Rome  Regulations:  Commentary  on the European  Rules  of the Conflict
of Laws. Alphen aan den Rijn, p. 642; Ofner, H. (2011) Die Rom II – Verordnung – Neues
Internationales  Privatrecht  für  auβervertragliche Schuldverh ltnisse  inӓ  der  Europ ischenӓ
Union. Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, 1, p. 22.
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exclude the application of the conflict-of-laws rules of the Conventions that
are based on the objective connecting factors.18
4. COMPARISON OF 1973 HAGUE CONVENTION AND 
ROME II REGULATION
Due to the exclusion  contained in the Article  2(1)  of the Hague  Convention
of 4  May  1971,  conflict-of-laws  rules  relevant  to product  liability  are
of particular  importance  when  it  comes  to the liability  of participants
in the production  and  distribution  chain  of autonomous  vehicles.
Approaches  for  determination  of the law  applicable  to product  liability
varies  between EU Member  States.  Depending  on the adjudicating  court,
different  national  law  may  be  regarded  as the governing  law  in the case
under the same circumstances.  Such negative effects of forum shopping are
not  fully  eliminated  by the ongoing  unification  of substantive  law within
the EU. The liability for damage caused by product, including autonomous
vehicle,  has  been  only  partially  harmonised  under  the Directive
85/374/EEC.19 Moreover, the Directive does not regulate liability for damage
caused by an intangible product (e.g. computer software). 
In some  member  states,20 the Hague  Convention  of 2  October  1973
on the law applicable to product liability is  to be applied.  The conflict-of-laws
regulation  adopted  in this  Convention  is  very  complex.  As a result,  few
States  have  signed  the Convention  and  even  fewer  have  ratified  it.21
The conflict-of-laws  rules  contained  therein  are  not  based  on a single
connecting  factor,  but  on group of connecting  factors  jointly  determining
the applicable legal system.
17 OGH, the ruling of 26 January 1995 2 Ob. 11/94. Available from: https://www.rip.bka.gv.at/
Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Justiz&Dokumentnummer=JJT_19950126_OGH0002_0020OB0001
1_9400000_000 [Accessed 15 March 2020].
18 The practical  significance of this  type  of choice  in relation  to road accidents  is  explained
by Graziano, T. (2016) Op. cit., p. 27 and Von Hein, J. (2009) Op. cit., p. 170.
19 Under  the Product  Liability  Directive,  a manufacturer  is  liable  for  damage  caused
by a defective  product.  However,  in the case  of an AI  based  system  such as autonomous
cars, it may be difficult to prove that there is a defect in the product, the damage that has
occurred and the causal link between the two. In addition, there is some uncertainty about
how and to what  extent  the Product  Liability  Directive  applies  in the case  of certain  types
of defects, for example if these result from weaknesses in the cybersecurity of the product
(see White Paper AI, p. 13).
20 These  are  Croatia,  Finland,  France,  Luxembourg,  The Netherlands,  Slovenia,  Spain –
as of 27  December  2018,  according  to the data  available  on the website  of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law – http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=convention
p.status&cid=84 [Accessed 15 March 2020].
21 The status  of the Convention  is  available  from: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/status-table/?cid=84 [Accessed 15 March 2020].
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The Convention  does  not  explicitly  address  the question  of the choice
of the law  made  by the parties.  Such  solution  is  nevertheless  accepted
by some authors.22
In the member  states  that  have  not  acceded  to the 1973  Hague
Convention,  the determination  of the law  applicable  to the assessment
of product liability is made on the basis of the Rome II Regulation.
What is important in case of autonomous vehicles is that the conflict-of-
-law rules system set out in the Rome II Regulation covers not only  non-
-contractual obligations based on principle of guilt but also such arising out
of strict  liability  and  that  the law  applicable  also  govern  the question
of the capacity to incur liability in tort (delict).
Primarily,  the parties are allowed to choose the applicable law (Article
14).23 Rome II Regulation introduced the principle of party autonomy and
allows parties to choose applicable law, provided that certain conditions are
met.  The aim  of this  solution  is  to enhance  legal  certainty.  So  far  courts
of the member  states’  practice  shows  that  the parties  (even  professional
entrepreneurs)  rarely  apply  this  solution.  Nevertheless,  it  has  many
benefits,24 such  as certainty  of the parties  that  a given  law  will  be
the governing  law  for  the dispute,  which  enables  foreseeing  the result
of the dispute, and that the choice of legi fori  (i.e. Czech law if the matter is
seized by Czech courts) facilitates and accelerates judicial proceedings.
Article 14 para. 1 point (a) of the Rome II Regulation allows the parties
to enter  into  agreement  submitting  the non-contractual  obligations
to the law of their choice, provided that such agreement is entered into after
the event giving rise to the damage occurred (so called subsequent choice
of law). This condition has its aim at protection of weaker parties (typically
the  injured  ones).25 Additionally,  Article  14  para. 1  point  (b)
of the Regulation allows the parties pursuing a commercial activity, to enter
22 Légier,  G. (2007)  Le réglement  Rome II  sur la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles,
JCP/La Semaine  Juridique – Edition Générale,  21 November  2007,  I-207,  pp. 54 and 56;  Von
Hein,  J.  (2009)  Europäisches Internationales  Deliktsrecht nach der Rom II –  Verordnung.
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 1, p. 32.
23 Żarnowiec, Ł. (2009) Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę wyrządzoną przez
produkt  niebezpieczny  w świetle  przepisów  rozporządzenia  Rzym  II.  Problemy  Prawa
Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, 5, pp. 102–103.
24 Pajor,  T.  (2002)  Comments  on a preliminary  draft  proposal  for  a Council  Regulation on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations, pp. 4 and 12–13; Basedow, J. et al. (2003) Hamburg
Group  for  Private  International  Law,  Comments  on the European  Commission’s  Draft
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non–Contractual Obligations,
Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 67, pp. 35–36.
25 Czepelak, M. (2015) Autonomia woli w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym Unii Europejskiej.
Warszawa, p. 62.
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into  such  agreement  even  before  the event  giving  rise  to the damage
occurred, provided that an agreement is freely negotiated (so called prior
choice  of law).  This  second  option  may  be  useful  for  entrepreneurs
remaining  in sustainable  economic  relations,  in particular  those  already
bonded by mutual contractual obligations and further want to enhance their
confidence and trust.26 The choice may be explicit or implicit, provided that
it  is  expressed  or demonstrated  with  reasonable  certainty
by the circumstances  of the case.  Where  establishing  the existence
of the agreement,  the court  has  to respect  the intentions  of the parties.  It
may not prejudice the rights of third parties (Article 14 para. 1 sentence 2).
It is beyond doubt that this solution enhances legal certainty particularly
in case  of new  technologies,  such  as autonomous  cars  as the entities
pursuing  commercial  activity –  by the reasonable  choice  of law –  may
exclude the applicability of an unknown foreign law. The above-mentioned
rule  enables,  therefore,  the introduction  of a specific  choice-of-law  clause
into a contract.  Such a clause may cover not only contractual obligations,
but also non-contractual obligations, in particular those arising from torts,
which  may  occur  between  the parties  in connection  to the execution
of the contract  (i.e. on the rental  of the autonomous  vehicle).  It  enables
the uniform application of the chosen law, both with regard to contractual
and non-contractual obligations. 
Similarly  as in case  of contractual  obligations,  where  all  the elements
relevant  to the situation  at the time  when  the event  giving  rise
to the damage occurs are located in a country other than the country whose
law  has  been  chosen,  the choice  of the parties  shall  not  prejudice
the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot
be derogated from by agreement (Art. 14 para. 2 of the Rome II Regulation).
An example would be national mandatory safety rules on the autonomous
vehicles. This means that such “choice of law” is not full in a meaning that
its  effects in a material  indication of a legal  regulation of chosen law only
and may  not  exclude  applicability  of mandatory  rules  of the law of such
other country.
Secondly, Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation provides set of conflict-of-
-laws  rules  for  the product  liability.27 Such  solution  is  justified  by two
reasons.  The first  is  the need  to strike  a balance  between  the need  for
26 Pazdan, M. (2017) Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe. Warszawa, p. 199.
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adequate protection of victims and the legitimate interest of entities claimed
to be  liable.28 The second  reason  is  the elimination  of accidental  and
surprising conflict-of-laws solutions.29
However, the scope of the conflict-of-laws rules contained in Article 5 is
not  fully  clear.  Most  importantly,  it  is  due  to the lack  of a definition
of a “product”. This has led to a discrepancy in the interpretations of these
provisions.  Some authors  propose  that  the definition  of the product  from
Article 2 of the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC should be used.30 This
means  that  the “product”  is  only  a physical,  movable  item.  This
interpretation  leads  to the exclusion  of non-material  products,  including
any  digital  content,  such  as software  based  on algorithms.  However,
in view  of the objectives  of the Regulation  as well  as the recital  11  of its
preamble,  it  seems  more  justifiable  to give  the concept  of a “product”
an autonomous  meaning.31 This  approach  make  it  possible  to avoid
unnecessary  restriction  and,  consequently,  allow  to include  all  kinds
of tangible  and  intangible,  movable  and  immovable  products  capable
of being traded,32 including digital content and algorithms.
Nor  does  it  seem appropriate  to limit  the scope  of the conflict-of-laws
rules  of Article  5  of the Regulation  to liability  solely  for  damage  caused
by the defective product.33 These  rules  specifically  do  not  use  the term
of “the defective” product.34 They refer to damage caused by a product which
27 The creation  of numerous  exceptions  to the general  rule  determining  the law  applicable
to tort/delict obligations has been criticised in the literature – see Koziol, H. and Thiede, T.
(2007)  Kritische  Bemerkungen  zum  derzeitigen  Stand  des Entwurfs  einer  Rom  II –
Verordnung.  Zeitschrift  für  vergleichende  Rechtswissenschaft,  106,  pp. 235–247.  Concerning
the history  of the work  on this  legal  norm  Heiderhoff,  B.  (2005)  Eine  europäische
Kollisionsnorm für die Produkthaftung: Gedanken zur Rom II – Verordnung. Zeitschrift für
das Privatrecht der Europäischen Union, 2, pp. 92–97.
28 Basedow, J. et al. (2003) Op. cit., p. 15.
29 Żarnowiec, Ł. (2009) Op. cit., p. 776.
30 Stone, P. (2007) The Rome II Regulation On Choice Of Law In Tort.  Ankara Law Review, 2,
p. 118; Stone,  P.  (2009)  Product Liability  under the Rome II Regulation.  In: J.  Ahern, W.
Binchy (eds.).  The Rome II,  p. 181;  Huber,  P.  and Illmer,  M. (2007)  International Product
Liability.  A Commentary  on Article  5  of The Rome  II  Regulation.  Yearbook  of Private
International Law, 9, pp. 37–38; Von Hein, J. (2009) Op. cit., p. 26.
31 Jagielska, M. (2005) Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za produkt – rozważania na tle
projektu  rozporządzenia  WE  o prawie  właściwym  dla  zobowiązań  pozaumownych.
In:  L.  Ogiegło,  W. Popiołek,  M. Szpunar (eds.). Rozprawy prawnicze.  Księga  pamiątkowa
Profesora Maksymiliana Pazdana, Kraków, p. 119.
32 Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M. (2009) The European Private International Law. Oxford, p. 551.
33 Illmer,  M.  (2009)  The New  European  Private  International  Law  of Product  Liability –
Steering Through Troubled  Waters.  Rabels  Zeitschrift  für  ausländisches  und  internationales
Privatrecht, 73, pp. 281–282.
34 Dickinson, A. (2008)  The Rome II Regulation: The law applicable to non-contractual obligations.
Oxford, p. 370.
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is  not so much defective as dangerous, and that danger may be a natural
characteristic  of the category  of product  concerned,  such  as autonomous
vehicle or its part, and not necessarily a result of its defect.
The conflict-of-laws  rule  expressed  in Article  5  takes  into  account,
on the one  hand,  the demand  to protect  the legitimate  expectations
of the injured  party  and,  on the other  hand,  protects  the interests
of the liable entity (e.g. producer of autonomous vehicle).35 The law that has
priority  is  the law  of habitual  residence  of the injured  party  at the time
of the occurrence  of the damage.  This  is  the legal  system  of the country
in which his personal interests are concentrated and with which the injured
party  is  best  acquainted.  However,  in the case  of any  of the solutions
provided for in Article 5(1)(1)(a) to (c), the interests of the potentially liable
party are also adequately protected.
In addition,  an escape  rule  based  on a much  closer  link  provided
by Article  5(2)  may  also  apply.  In practice,  it  is  the case  where  special
relationship  between  the party  held  liable  and  the first  purchaser
of the product  exists.  However,  any  automatism  in application  of such
escape  rule  by the court  should  be  avoided,  and  must  be  always  based
on an in-depth assessment of the circumstances of the individual accident.36
The Rome  II  Regulation  is  to applied  by courts  of the member  states
in universal  way,  which  means  that  law determined  as applicable  under
the Regulation  must  be  applied  whether  or not  it  is  the law  of any  EU
member state. Also application of renvoi is excluded by Article 24 of Rome II
Regulation.  Such  approach  significantly  decreases  forum  shopping  risk.37
Additionally,  the Rome  II  Regulation,  must  be  also  applied  irrespective
of the nature of the court or tribunal seised. This means, among others, that
criminal courts of the member states adjudicating non-contractual liability
aspects  related  to crimes  are  obliged  to determine  applicable  law
on the basis of this Regulation.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As it follows from the above analysis existing conflict-of-laws regulation for
the determination  of the law  applicable  to the damages  caused  by traffic
35 Comp. Hibbert, M. (2007) New EU choice of law rules for tort and product liability claims
finalised. European Product Liability Review, 9, pp. 12–14.
36 Żarnowiec, Ł. (2009) Op. cit., p. 784.
37 Pazdan, M. (2017) Op. cit., p. 747.
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accident involving an autonomous vehicle is complicated and complex. It
creates a risk of forum shopping  and, in addition,  makes the legal situation
of the injured  party  more  difficult.  We  therefore  recommend  change
of the conflict-of-laws  regulation  for  accidents  involving  autonomous
vehicles  in order  to harmonise  and  simplify  the procedure  for
determination of the applicable law. Injured parties need to enjoy the same
level  of protection  as persons  having  suffered  harm  caused  by other
technologies. At the same time technological innovation should be allowed
to continue to develop.38
One of the possible solutions is  to introduce additional  conflict-of-laws
rules  on traffic  accidents  into  the Rome II  Regulation  that  will  be  based
on the 1971  Hague  Convention (this  would  mean  assimilation
of the Convention  into  a Regulation).  In result  the uniform  method
of determining  the applicable  law  in all  the member  states  participating
in the Regulation  could  be  applied  by the courts  of the member  states,
irrespective  of whether  or not  the court  state  is  party  to the Hague
Convention.  Such  solution  partially  eliminates  the risk  of forum shopping,
leading  to the application  of the same  law  regardless  of the location
of the adjudicating  court.  At the same  time,  this  means  that  practical
problems  encountered  in the application  of the Hague  Convention  would
be  mirrored  in the Rome  II  Regulation.  That  is  why  this  solution  is  not
optimal and should not be recommended.39
The issue  of road  accidents  involving  autonomous  vehicles  does  not,
in our opinion, justify a fundamental change of the method of the applicable
law determination,  such as applying the new method based on favouring
the injured  party.40 An example  would  be  to split  the tort  statute
(the applicable  law)  in such  a way  that  the issues  of the type  of damage
covered  and  the method  of calculating  compensation  are  governed
by the law  of the country  of the injured  party  habitual  residence.41 This
solution is not acceptable.42 The person claimed to be liable should not be
forced  to take  into  account  the potential  application  of different  foreign
38 White Paper AI, p. 15.
39 Pazdan,  M. et al.  (2013)  W odpowiedzi  na ankietę  skierowaną do państw członkowskich
Unii,  dotyczącą  stosowania  Rozporządzenia  nr  864/2007  o prawie  właściwym  dla
zobowiązań pozaumownych (Rzym II).  Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, 12,
p. 171.
40 As in the case  of the weaker  party,  e.g. consumers  in private  international  law –
cf. Jacquemin,  H.  and  Hubin,  J.-B.  (2017)  Aspects  contractuels  et de responsabilité  civile
en matière d'intelligence artificielle. Bruxelles, pp. 89–93.
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laws.43 In the case  of autonomous  vehicles,  this  argument  becomes  even
more relevant as the person responsible for the damage does not necessarily
have to be the vehicle driver. 
It  is  therefore  justified  to preserve  the general  application  of the law
of the place  where  the direct  damage  occurred  (the place  of the accident).
This  constitutes  a compromise  for  both  the person  to be  liable  and
the injured party, who cannot count on application of the law of the country
of his  or her  habitual  residence.44 In addition,  it  results  in application
of the same law to assess the liability of different entities potentially liable
for the accident involving autonomous car, irrespective of their qualification
as a driver,  the owner  of the vehicle,  the transport  provider  or internet
service provider. In the case of the multiple liability of several persons this
would be a significant  facilitation not only for the injured party, but also
in the event of recourse claim between co-debtors.
The question  is  how  to implement  this  legal  framework  to existing
legislation.  In our  view,  the general  provisions  of the Rome II  Regulation
and in particular its Article 4, should be used as the main legal basis. One
should agree that the 1971 Hague Convention  is  an act of inferior quality
to the Rome II Regulation.45 It's outdated and complicated. It unjustifiably
recognises the importance of the place of registration of a vehicle,  which is
a substitute  for  the habitual  residence  of the driver,  owner  or driver
of the vehicle,  thereby  protecting  only  the interests  of the driver,  owner
or driver  of the vehicle  and  their  insurer.  There  is  no  justification  for
subjecting  the type  of damage  and  its  assessment  to the law  favourable
to the person  claimed  to be liable.  The priority  in all  the member  states
should  be  given  to the provisions  of the Rome  II  Regulation  over  those
of the Convention, at least for those cases when both the injured party and
41 Such  a solution  was  proposed  at the first  reading  of the draft  Rome  II  regulation
in the Parliament, but due to opposition from the Commission and the Council it was not
included  in the finally  adopted  text – Symonides.  P.  (2008)  Rome II  and Tort  Conflicts:
A Missed  Opportunity.  American  Journal  of Comparative  Law,  p. 205;  Von  Hein,  J.  (2009)
Op. cit., pp. 155 and 160.
42 Critical  of such  a solution:  Unberath,  H.  and  Cziupka,  J.  (2011)  In:  T.  Rauscher  (ed.).
Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR Kommentar. München, p. 741.
43 Pazdan, M. et al. (2011) Op. cit., p. 171.
44 Ibid.
45 Staudinger, A. and Czaplinski, P. (2009) Verkehrsopferschutz im Lichte der Rom I-, Rom II-
sowie Brüssel I-Verordnung. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 3, p. 2254.
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the person held liable were, at the time of the accident, habitually resident
in any of the member states.46
For both legal instruments,  that is  the Regulation and the Convention,
the basic  rule  is  practically  the same,  which  means  that  the method  for
determining  the applicable  law  would  remain  the same.  Under  the 1971
Hague  Convention  (Article  3)  the law  of the place  of the accident  is
applicable.  According  to the Rome  II  Regulation,  the governing  law  is
the law of the place  of direct  damage [Article  4(1)].47 For both these legal
instruments, the ex-post  choice of law is allowed (although such solution is
not  explicitly  provided  by the wording  of the Convention).48 It  is  worth
recalling that the conflict-of-laws rules of the Rome II  Regulation are also
applicable  in matters  excluded  from  the scope  of the 1971  Hague
Convention. 
The main difference would concern the situation when the injured party
and  the person  claimed  to be  liable  have  their  habitual  residence
in the same  member  state.  In such  case,  the Rome  II  Regulation  leads
to the application  of the law  of the country  of habitual  residence
of the parties  to the dispute [Article  4(2)].49 This  is  a significant  advantage
of the Rome II Regulation over the 1971 Hague Convention.50 Furthermore,
the Rome  II  Regulation  allows  the courts  to use,  where  appropriate,
the escape  rule  [Article  4(3)],  without  giving  any  significance
to the connecting factor of the place of registration of the vehicle.51 
Our recommended solution is  therefore to give priority to the Rome II
Regulation over the 1971 Hague Convention. This requires a corresponding
revision to the wording of Article 28 of the Regulation.52 One must state that
it  is  disappointing  that  the opportunity  offered  by the review  clause
in Article 30 of the Regulation has not been used for this purpose so far.53
46 Graziano, T. (2016) Op. cit., p. 31; Pazdan, M. et al. (2011) Op. cit., p. 171.
47 As for the practical convergence resulting from the use of both connecting factors, cf. Nagy,
C. (2010) Op. cit., pp. 98–99 and 102.
48 On the benefits,  cf.  Mills,  A.  (2018)  Party  Autonomy  in Private  International  Law. Oxford,
pp. 390–454.
49 As regards the practical relevance of this standard in relation to road traffic accidents, see
Junker, A. (2008) Das internationale Privatrecht der Straβenverkehrsunf lle nach der Romӓ
II – Verordnung, JuristenZeitung, 4, p. 174.
50 Graziano, T. (2016) Op. cit., p. 27; Graziano, T. (2016) Op. cit., p. 55; Nagy, C. (2010) Op. cit.,
p. 107.
51 Nagy, C. (2010) Op. cit., p. 107.
52 Halfmeier, A. and Sonder, N. (2011) Op. cit., pp. 642–643; Nagy, C. (2010) Op. cit., p. 108.
53 Dickinson,  A.  (2008)  Op. cit.,  p. 362;  Staudinger,  A.  and  Czaplinski,  P.  (2009)  Op. cit.,
p. 2254.
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The following  arguments  can  be  used  as the justification  for  such
changes in correlation with the review clause in Article 30 of the Regulation.
Firstly,  a connection  with  the country  where  the direct  damage  occurred
(lex loci  damni)  adopted under Article  4(1)  the Rome II  Regulation strikes
a fair  balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable  and
the person sustaining  the damage,  and also reflects  the modern approach
to civil liability and the development of systems of strict liability.54 The main
argument is that, while the party claimed to be liable should be protected,
the interests of the country where the damage occurred should also be taken
into  account.  It  is  also  justified  by the expectations  of the injured  party.
As for  the perpetrator,  it  is  argued  that  he  should  foresee  the place
of the result  (damage)  of his  activities.  It  is  also  important  that  the place
of damage  can  be  determined  with  some  ease.  In recent  Florin  Lazar
judgment rendered on 10 December 2015 (C-350/14), the ECJ observed that
the uniform  conflict-of-laws  rules  laid  down  in the Rome  II  Regulation
purports to “enhance the foreseeability of court decisions” and to
“ensure  a reasonable  balance  between  the interests  of the person  claimed
to be liable and the person who has sustained damage”,
and that 
“a connection  with  the country  where  the direct  damage  occurred  […]
strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable
and the person sustaining the damage”. 
In case  of physical  injuries  caused  to a person  or the damage  caused
to goods,  the country  of the place  where  the direct  damage  occurs  is
the country of the place where the injuries were suffered or the goods were
damaged.  In the case  of a road traffic  accident,  the damage  is  constituted
by the injuries  suffered  by the direct  victim,  while  the damage  sustained
by the close relatives of the latter must be regarded as indirect consequences
of the accident.  The ECJ  clarified  the interpretation  of Article  4  para. 1
in Florin Lazar judgment with regard to difference between “direct damage”
and  an “indirect  consequence”  of the event,  which  has  no  bearing
on the identification of the applicable law.
54 Świerczyński, M. and Żarnowiec, Ł. (2015) In: Pazdan, M. (ed.).  System Prawa Prywatnego.
Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe. Warszawa, p. 766.
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In some circumstances exclusive application of lex loci damni  rule under
Article  4 (1)  would  lead  to excessive  simplification  of the process
of determination  of the applicable  law,  as it  is  possible  that  the “gravity”
of a non-contractual  obligation  is  located  in a different  country  than
the country  in which  the direct  damage  occurred.  This  is  why  Article  4
in next two paragraphs establishes two major exemptions from this the lex
loci  rule,  making  it  less  arbitrary,  and the whole system more workable.
Main exception to the principal rule is provided by Article 4 (2) of the Rome
II  Regulation.  It  states  that  where  the person  claimed  to be  liable  and
the person  sustaining  damage  both  have  their  habitual  residence
in the same  country  at the time  when  the damage  occurs,  the law  of that
country  shall  apply.  This  so  called  “common law of the parties”  reflects
the legitimate  expectations  of the two  parties.  Under  Rome II  Regulation
courts  of the member  states  should  first  enquiry  whether  the person
claimed  to be  liable  and  the person  sustaining  damage  both  had  their
habitual  residence  in the same  country  at the time  when  the damage
occurred, and only if the answer is negative apply law of country in which
the direct  damage occurred.  In both cases  the result  of law determination
can be still changed if the requirements of the “escape clause” are met.55
Additionally,  an “escape  clause”  from  both  Article  4 (1)  and  (2)  is
provided by Article  4 para. 3  which  allows a departure  from both above
rules. However, it must be clear from all the circumstances of the case that
the tort/delict  is  manifestly  more  closely  connected  with  a country  other
than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, and only is such case, on the basis
of this “escape clause” the law of that other country shall apply. There are
several  limitations  preventing  courts  from excessive,  abusive  application
of this  “escape  clause”,  such  as requirements  that  tort/delict  connection
with such other country must  be manifestly  more closely connected and
that  this  must  be  clear  from  all  the circumstances  of the case.  A useful
guideline  is  provided  by the Regulation  in the second  sentence  of Article
4 (3) where it is explained that a manifestly closer connection with another
country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between
the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict
in question.  The escape  clause,  in the  meaning  of art. 4  para. 3,  may play
an essential  role in  practice.  Courts  of the member state  are not  allowed,
55 Pazdan, M. (2017) Op. cit., p. 199.
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however,  to abuse  this  possibility,  by,  for  example,  refusing  freedom
of choice,  or unjustified  correction  of the conflict-of-laws  rules  in order
to obtain  a particular,  material  aim  (i.e. the realisation  of the state  interest
related  to the substantive  regulation  of autonomous  vehicles  and/or
artificial  intelligence).  It  would  be  incorrect  to use  Rome  II  Regulation
by court  of the member  state  just  to justify  application,  depending
on the case,  of legi  fori  on different  basis  (e.g. lex loci  damni  rule or escape
clause)  whatever  suits  the judge  better.  There  should  be  no  preference
of national law application and discrimination of foreign law.
In our opinion Rome II Regulation does not need to contain any conflict-
-of-laws rules which directly concern the obligations due to traffic accidents
involving autonomous vehicles. The conflict-of-laws framework should be
general, synthetic and neutral to face technological  development. For this
reason,  courts  of the member  states  may  apply  the law  of a particular
country  with  a substantial  margin  of appreciation.  However,  it  does  not
mean  that  decision  on the applicable  law  is  to be  left  entirely
to the discretion of court, which would be free to determine the national law
most  closely related to the relevant  situation.  No doubt,  if accepted,  such
practice  would  raise  the level  of legal  uncertainty,  which  might  even
endanger the safety of transport and use of autonomous vehicles. 
The case  is  different  with  regard  to the potential  liability
of the manufacturers  (importers  or sellers)  of autonomous  vehicles,  their
components or the digital content (software) on which they operate. In such
case,  the general  public  interest  in supporting  technological  development
and the call for fair risk-sharing should be taken into consideration. These
objectives  are  fully  met  by conflict-of-laws  rule  on product  liability  laid
down in Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation and general rules of its Article 4
does  not  need  to be  applied.  Although  it  gives  rise  to some  doubts
on interpretation  of Article  5,  it  seems  that  the adopted  conflict-of-laws
regulation is  well  balanced.  It  strikes  a fair  balance  between the interests
and  risks  of the innovative  entrepreneur  and  users  of such  innovations,
including persons potentially injured by the vehicle.
Another  strong  argument  in favour  of the application  of Rome  II
Regulation  over  the Hague  Conventions  is  that  this  Regulation  also
determines  the scope  of applicable  law  in some  details.  Applicable  law
under  the Rome  II  Regulation  covers  both  the source  of an obligation,
as well  an obligation  resulting  from an obligation.  It  applies  also  to non-
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-contractual obligations  that  are  likely  to arise  [Article  2  (2)].  Pursuant
to Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations under the Regulation governs in particular: the basis and extent
of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held liable
for acts performed by them; the grounds for exemption from liability, any
limitation of liability and any division of liability; the existence, the nature
and  the assessment  of damage  or the remedy  claimed;  within  the limits
of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the measures which
a court  may  take  to prevent  or terminate  injury  or damage  or to ensure
the provision  of compensation;  the question  whether  a right  to claim
damages or a remedy may be transferred, including by inheritance; persons
entitled  to compensation  for  damage  sustained  personally;  liability  for
the acts  of another  person;  the manner  in which  an obligation  may  be
extinguished  and  rules  of prescription  and  limitation,  including  rules
relating  to the commencement,  interruption  and  suspension  of a period
of prescription or limitation.
The designated  law  also  determines  the persons  entitled
to compensation  for  damage  they  have  sustained  personally.  It  covers,
among others, whether a person other than the “direct victim” may obtain
compensation  “by ricochet”,  following  damage  sustained  by the victim.
An example is psychological damage, which includes the suffering caused
by the death  of a close  relative,  or financial,  sustained  for  example
by the children or spouse of a deceased person.
In addition  to the general  guidelines  of Article  15,  the Rome  II
Regulation  provides  also  several  useful  guidelines  relating  to the scope
of the applicable law. The Regulation applies to non-contractual obligations
in civil  and  commercial  matters  only,  in situations  involving  a conflict
of laws.  It  does  not  apply,  in particular,  to revenue,  customs
or administrative  matters  (Art. 1  para. 1).  This  exclusion  needs  to be
absolutely  reasonable  as the public  and  civil  law  regulations
on autonomous  vehicles  need  to be  clearly  distinguished  from  one
to another. Additionally,  pursuant  to Article  18 of the Rome II  Regulation
the person  having  suffered  damage  may  bring  his  or her  claim  directly
against  the insurer of the person liable to provide compensation if the law
applicable  to the non-contractual  obligation  or the law  applicable
to the insurance contract so provides. This is so called direct action against
the insurer of the person liable.
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It  is  also  worth  to mention  with  regard  to autonomous  vehicles  that
Article  17  of the Regulation  indicates  that  in assessing  the conduct
of the person claimed to be liable, account shall be taken, as a matter of fact
and  in so  far  as is  appropriate,  of the rules  of safety  and  conduct  which
were  in force  at the place  and time of the event  giving  rise  to the liability
(rules of safety and conduct). The term “rules of safety and conduct” should
be interpreted as referring to all  regulations  having any relation to safety
and  conduct,  including,  for  example,  road  safety  rules  in the case
of an accident (see recital 34 of the Preamble of the Rome II Regulation).
The Rome  II  Regulation  sets  out  also  the framework  for  refusal
of the application  of a provision  of the law  of any  country  specified
by the Regulation  due  to the public  policy  (ordre  public)  of the forum,
provided that this exception is permitted only if application of such law is
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum (Article 26). For
example,  the application  of a provision  of the law  designated
by the Regulation  which  would  have  the effect  of causing  non-
-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages of an excessive nature to be
awarded  to the person  injured  by the accident  involving  autonomous
vehicles  should  be  treated  as being  contrary  to the public  policy  (ordre
public).
As we  see  there  are  many  arguments  in favour  of the uniform
application  of the Rome  II  Regulation  to all  civil  consequences  resulting
from the traffic  accident  involving autonomous vehicles.  However,  while
endorsing the solution adopted in Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation, it is
important to add that the basic objection raised against the EU conflict-of-
-laws  regulation  used  for  determination  the law  applicable  to product
liability is  the dualism of the sources of law. Some EU member states are
still  bound  by the 1973  Hague  Convention.56 The critical  assessment
of the Convention  proves  that  a simple  incorporation  of its  rules  into
the Rome II Regulation would be wrong. As in the case of the 1971 Hague
Convention,  a much  better  and  simpler  option  seems  to be  to give  full
priority  to the Rome II  Regulation  over  the Convention.  As stated  above,
this  also  requires  revision  to the wording  of Article  28  of the Rome  II
Regulation.
56 Pazdan, M. et al. (2013) Op. cit., pp. 177–178.
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions result from our analysis:
In order to determine who is liable for damages, it is necessary to take
into  account  the technology  used,  including  the degree  of autonomy
of the concerned  vehicle  and  its  impact  on the occurrence  of the traffic
accident.  The allocation  of liability  depends  on the circumstances
of the individual case.
Uncertainty  exists  as regards  the allocation  of responsibilities  between
different  economic  operators  (e.g. driver,  owner  of the vehicle,
manufacturer  or service  provider).  Each  case  must  be  settled  under
applicable,  national  legal  system  (the applicable  law).  Depending
on the person claimed  to be  liable  the governing  law is  to be  determined
on the basis of different conflict-of-laws rules. 
Court may need to apply not only the specific rules on traffic accidents
but also conflict-of-laws rules on product liability (e.g. of the manufacturer
of parts) or even general conflict-of-laws rules on torts/delicts.
Currently,  determination  of the law  applicable  to traffic  accidents  is
highly  problematic.  The current  conflict-of-laws  regulation  seems  to be
excessively complex in case of traffic accidents. This creates a risk of forum
shopping  and,  in addition,  makes  the legal  situation  of the injured  party
more difficult.
The need for unification and simplification of the conflict-of-laws rules
does  not  require  that  the injured  party  is  to be  treated in favoured way.
Conflict-of-laws regulation should be balanced and take into account also
the legitimate interests of the person claimed to be liable. 
In this  paper  we  recommend  change  of the conflict-of-laws  regulation
for  accidents  involving  autonomous  vehicles  in order  to harmonise  and
simplify  the procedure  for  determination  of the applicable  law.  Injured
parties  need  to enjoy  the same  level  of protection  as persons  having
suffered  harm  caused  by other  technologies,  whilst  technological
innovation should be allowed to continue to develop.
In this  paper we also  state that  it  is  reasonable  to use as a main  basis
the general provisions of the Rome II Regulation and in particular its Article
4.  Rome II  Regulation does not  need to be  supplemented by any special
conflict-of-laws rules which would directly regulate the obligations arising
from autonomous vehicles.
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As to the potential  liability  of the manufacturers  (importers  or sellers)
of autonomous vehicles, their components or the digital content (software)
on which  they  operate,  the conflict-of-laws  rule  on product  liability  laid
down  in Article  5  of the Rome II  Regulation  is  satisfactory.  It  takes  into
account, on the one hand, the demand to protect the legitimate expectations
of the injured  party  and,  on the other  hand,  protects  the interests
of the liable entity (e.g. producer of autonomous vehicle).
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